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Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of
Intentional Spoliation of Evidence
Phyllis Smith was injured when the wheel of an oncoming
Ford van separated from the vehicle and crashed through the
windshield of her car.' Abbott Ford, the dealer that customized
the van, towed the van to its shop for repairs and promised
Smith that it would preserve the van's wheels and brakes pend-
ing Smith's further investigation into the cause of the accident
for purposes of a possible personal injury action. Abbott Ford
thereafter claimed to have destroyed, lost, or transferred the
parts, rendering any inspection impossible. Smith brought suit
against Abbott Ford, alleging that it had tortiously interfered
with her prospective civil action by intentionally spoliating evi-
dence, and she claimed as damages the significant prejudice of
her opportunity to obtain compensation for her injuries.2 The
trial court rejected the new tort and sustained Abbott Ford's
demurrer.3 The California Court of Appeals for the Second
District reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs action,
holding that Smith could proceed with a tort action against Ab-
bott Ford for interference with a prospective civil suit by inten-
tional spoliation of evidence.4 Smith v. Superior Cour4 151 Cal.
App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
1. Smith suffered permanent blindness and impairment of her sense of
smell. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829,
831 (1984).
2. Id. at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
3. Id at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Plaintiff thereafter filed a petition for
a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to allow the cause of action.
4. Id. at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The appellate court restricted the use
of the new tort to cases in which the underlying litigation had not yet gone to
trial, thereby avoiding problems of collateral estoppel.
After the appellate court decision, the California Supreme Court denied a
rehearing, leaving the new tort intact. Faced with the task of defending the
suit, Abbott Ford announced that the missing van parts had reappeared.
Within weeks, Smith and Abbott Ford settled in principle; Smith dropped the
new tort action and the original personal injury suit in exchange for Abbott
Ford's payment of a large sum of money. See Goodrich, Gone today, here to-
morrow, 4 CAL LAW., June, 1984, at 15.
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The Smith court's recognition of a new tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence raises several important issues. Recog-
nizing a new tort action requires the court to identify an imper-
missible interference with a legally protectable interest and
then to apply the traditional tort elements to the allegedly tor-
tious conduct.5 A court asked to recognize the new tort of in-
tentional spoliation of evidence must first determine whether
the right to bring a personal injury lawsuit is a legally protect-
able interest. If the court determines that the interest is de-
serving of legal protection, it must next decide whether
interference with that interest by intentional spoliation of evi-
dence is tortious conduct. In doing so, the court must deter-
mine how to apply the traditional tort elements of intent,
causation, and damages. In addition, because most states, like
California, have a criminal statute that proscribes the inten-
tional destruction of evidence, 6 the court must consider
whether the existence of criminal sanctions precludes the
plaintiff's tort action. Finally, in determining whether to recog-
nize a separate tort action, the court must measure the ade-
quacy of existing means of dealing with spoliation of evidence
within the framework of the underlying litigation itself.7
Although no court prior to Smith had recognized spoliation
of evidence as a separate tort, new torts often are created
through the judicial process.8 In considering recognition of a
new tort, a threshold consideration is whether the alleged con-
duct tortiously interferes with a legally protectable interest,
5. An intentional tort action requires an allegation of intent, W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 7 (4th ed. 1971); causation, id. §§ 41,
42; and harm, id. § 30. A tort action for negligence requires, in place of intent,
defendant's breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. Id. § 30.
6. Section 135 of the California Penal Code provides:
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument
in writing, or other matter or thing, is about to be produced in evi-
dence upon any trial, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized
by law, willfully destroys or conceals the same, with intent thereby to
prevent it from being produced, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 1970); see also infra note 23 and accompanying
text.
7. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
8. See 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 10, at 2310 (8th
ed. 1974); see also Knepper, Review of Recent Tort Trends, 33 DEF. 1, 15 (1984)
(describing judicial recognition of the tort of bad faith used to punish insurers
for bad faith refusal to pay benefits to insureds). New torts are also recog-
nized through the legislative process. See Knepper, supra, at 12 (reporting the
Supreme Court's ruling that Congress, in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, created a species of
tort liability in favor of persons deprived of federally secured rights); see also
infra note 26 (state wrongful death statutes).
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however novel the interest or the resulting injury may be.9 In
allowing tort actions for invasion of privacy' ° and wrongful
birth," for example, courts have recognized interests that pre-
viously had not received legal protection. Once injury and dam-
ages are shown, the court asked to find the interest protected
must carefully evaluate the proposed tort in light of additional
policy considerations, including
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach
12
9. See W. PRoSsER, supra note 5, § 1, at 3-4 ("When it becomes clear that
the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of
the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as
a bar to the remedy.").
10. For the original argument supporting a tort action for invasion of pri-
vacy, see Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. I REV. 193, 195
(1890) (arguing for the protection of private individuals from the growing
abuses of the press). Professor William L. Prosser defines the tort of invasion
of privacy as an amalgam of four separate torts: "L Intrusion upon the plain-
tiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation, for the defend-
ant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
L. REv. 383, 389 (1960); see e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91
(1931) (plaintiff entitled to recover for emotional injury suffered as a result of
defendant's exhibition of a movie that enacted the true story of plaintiff's past
experiences as a prostitute and accused murderess); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky.
765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (defendant garage manager invaded plaintiff's right to
privacy by putting up a notice in his window announcing to the world that
plaintiff owed him money). The Supreme Court also has expanded the right
to privacy to protect more personal individual interests. See, eg., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the details of marital intimacy
such as the use of contraceptives).
11. Wrongful birth actions have been brought by parents against medical
professionals whose negligence proximately caused the birth of an unwanted
child. Courts have held that the parents' interest in making an informed pro-
creative choice is invaded by the negligence of such medical professionals. The
deprivation of the parents' opportunity to choose not to conceive the child is
therefore a legally compensable injury. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658
F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents of rubella syndrome child entitled to recover
in tort from doctors who failed to diagnose pregnant woman's rubella and to
inform her of the potential danger to the fetus); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (wrongful birth action permitted against a
physician whose negligent performance of a sterilization failed to prevent an
unwanted birth).
12. Rowland v. Christen, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 1, at 6 ("[The law
1985]
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If the benefits of recognizing the new tort outweigh its accom-
panying burdens, the court should create the new cause of
action.
Interference torts were first recognized in the mid-nine-
teenth century beginning with the tort of interference with
contractual relations. In the original interference tort action,
the obligee of a contract sued a third party for inducing the ob-
ligor to breach the contract.13 The court held that the obligee's
interest in the fulfillment of the contract was a legally pro-
tected interest, and the defendant's interference was therefore
tortious.14 Modern American interference tort doctrine later
expanded the scope of protected interests to include various
commercial and economic relationships, even in cases in which
no legally enforceable contractual obligation existed.15 Such
torts include unjustifiable interference with a prospective ad-
vantage16 and unjustifiable interference with business rela-
must measure [the defendant's] acts, and the harm he has done, by an objec-
tive disinterested and social standard.").
13. Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
14. Id. at 231, 118 Eng. Rep. at 755. In early tort actions for interference
with contractual relations, the defendant's motive or purpose was often the de-
cisive factor in the determination of liability. See, e.g., Dunshee v. Standard
Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911) (malicious motive to drive competing
company out of business provides a basis of tort liability for interference with
business relations); cf. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Eco-
nomic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
61, 97 (1982) (suggesting that interference tort liability be imposed only when
the interfering act is wrongful in itself rather than basing liability on subjec-
tive motivation or malice). The malice requirement has been replaced in in-
tentional interference with contract cases by the requirement that the
defendant, with knowledge of the other party's interests, intended to act in
such a way that will have the effect of interfering with plaintiff's contract.
The malice requirement, however, still lingers in negligent interference with
contract actions. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 130, at 952, 956.
15. See Zimmerman v. Bank of Am., 191 Cal. App. 2d 55, 57, 12 Cal. Rptr.
319, 321 (1961) ("The actionable wrong lies in the inducement to break the
contract or sever the relationship, not in the kind of contract or relationship so
disrupted, whether it is written or oral, enforceable or not enforceable."); RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 130,
at 949-62; see also Broida & Handler, Tortious Interference with Contract and
Prospective Advantage in Illinois, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 325, 327-28 (1983) (pro-
tected relationships include contracts and expectations of financial advantage);
Note, Interference with Contractual and Business Relations in Alabama, 34
Ala. L. Rev. 559, 628 (1983) (Alabama courts' recognition of tort actions for in-
tentional interference with contracts and business relations).
16. The elements of the tort of interference with a prospective advantage
are 1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third person
containing the probability of future economic benefits to the plaintiff; 2) the
defendant's knowledge of the existence of the relationship; 3) the defendant's
intentional conduct designed to disrupt the relationship; 4) actual disruption of
[Vol. 69:961
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tions.17 Interference torts recognize the value of "probable
expectancies," even though the expectancy is merely prospec-
tive. In cases of intentional interference with a prospective ad-
vantage, for example, a plaintiff is required to prove only that
the defendant injured the plaintiff by intentionally disrupting a
relationship containing the "probability" of future economic
benefit.' 8
After identifying a new interest deserving of legal protec-
tion, the court next must determine whether the defendant's
conduct invading that interest is tortious. For intentional torts,
the plaintiff must prove the traditional elements of intent, cau-
sation, and harm. 9 Intent means that the defendant desired to
bring about the injury or acted with knowledge that the harm
was substantially certain to follow from the conduct.20  The
causation element is two-fold: plaintiff must show first that the
harm would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's con-
duct and, second, that the conduct proximately caused plain-
tiffs injury.2 ' The element of harm requires the plaintiff to
show a legally cognizable injury and to prove the amount of
damages with reasonable certainty.22
Most courts thus far have attempted to address the prob-
lem of the intentional spoliation of evidence through criminal
obstruction of justice laws23 rather than through recognition of
the relationship; and 5) damages proximately caused by the acts of defendant.
See Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr.
745, 756 (1975).
17. The elements of the tort of interference with business relations are
1) the defendant's intentional conduct designed to interfere with plaintiff's
business relations; 2) the defendant's improper, wrongful, or unlawful conduct;
3) actual interference by defendant's affirmative or threatened act; and
4) damages proximately caused by the defendant's interference. See Purcell
Co. v. Spriggs Enter., Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 522 (Ala. 1983) (per curiam); see also
Note, supra note 15, at 600-61 (tort of interference with business relations is
also known as interference with advantageous economic relations).
18. See, eg., Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122
Cal. Rptr. 745, 756 (1975) (defendant real estate buyer tortiously interfered
with plaintiff broker's expected commission by inducing vendor to violate the
terms of the listing agreement); Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49
Cal. App. 3d 365, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975) (defendant's distribution of mislead-
ing leaflets tortiously interfered with plaintiff's prospective victory in local
election).
19. See supra note 5.
20. See W. PROSSER, sup, note 5, § 8.
21. See id. §§ 41-42.
22. Id § 30, at 143-44.
23. Criminal statutes dealing with intentional spoliation of evidence in-
clude: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2809 (1978) (felony); Aim. STAT. ANN. § 41-
2611 (1977) (felony if actor's conduct obstructs prosecution or defense of a fel-
1985]
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a separate tort action. Although criminal statutes commonly do
not preclude civil liability for the same criminal conduct,2" a
number of courts have relied on the existence of these criminal
penalties in refusing to recognize tort actions for the inten-
tional spoliation of evidence.25 Violations of a criminal statute
often provide the basis for intentional tort actions. Intentional
homicide, for example, may result in a civil suit for wrongful
death.26 Similarily, assault and battery carry both criminal
penalties27 and civil remedies.28 False imprisonment is another
illustration of conduct that is both criminal29 and tortious.30
Moreover, criminal statutes frequently provide the basis for
tort actions in negligence by defining the duty of care owed by
the actor. 31 A violation of the statute breaches the duty owed,
ony; in other cases, spoliation constitutes a misdemeanor); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 135 (West 1970) (misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-610 (1978) (felony);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53 a-155 (1972) (felony); FLA STAT. ANN. § 918.13
(West 1973) (felony only if actor knew criminal trial or proceeding was pend-
ing); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1975) (felony); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 37.10 (Vernon 1974) (misdemeanor). See generally Note, Legal Ethics
and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1671-73 (1979) (noting dif-
ferences in statutes prohibiting the destruction of evidence depending on
whether the destruction occured before or during trial, whether the evidence
was to be used in a criminal or civil trial, and whether the actor intended to
destroy the evidence).
24. See infra notes 26-32. In the past, however, criminal statutes often
barred civil actions for the same conduct. See Note, Civil Remedies for Per-
jury: A Proposal for a Tort Action, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 349, 365 (1977) ("A civil
action for damages [arising out of perjury] must be disallowed, for 'the defend-
ant might twice be punished ... by the statute, and by this action, which is
not reasonable." (quoting Damport v. Sympson, 78 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1596)).
25. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
26. Every state now has a wrongful death statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 6-5-410 (1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.16-.27 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (Smith-Hurd
1959); MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1984); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 5-4.1
(McKinney Supp. 1984); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1982). See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 127, at 902.
27. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 240 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-59 (West Supp. 1984); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.011 (West 1976); MINN. STAT. § 609.221 (1984).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 13, 29 (1964).
29. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170 (Vernon 1953).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1964).
31. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 36, at 191; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 285, 286 (1964); see, e.g., Rimco Realty & Inv. Corp. v. LaVigne, 114
Ind. App. 211, 50 N.E.2d 953 (1943) (lessor's violation of criminal statute gov-
erning permissible types of garbage chutes provided a basis for tenant's negli-
gence action against lessor for property damage resulting from chute fire);
Hyde v. Maison Hortense, Inc., 132 Misc. 399, 229 N.Y.S. 666 (1928), affd mem.,
225 A.D. 799, 232 N.Y.S. 776, affd mem., 252 N.Y. 534, 170 N.E. 133 (1929) (les-
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constituting negligence for which the violator may be held lia-
ble to persons injured thereby.32
Although criminal statutes often provide the basis for civil
actions founded on the same conduct, the California Court of
Appeals in Agnew v. Parks 33 refused to allow a tort action for
obstruction of justice, citing a number of criminal statutes gov-
erning the allegedly tortious conduct.34 In Agnew, the plaintiff,
sor's violation of law requiring elevator shaft guard provided basis for negli-
gence action by one injured by falling down an unguarded shaft). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, purports to limit the effect of viola-
tion of a criminal statute as proof of a breach of duty in civil actions:
The court will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively...
d) to protect a class of persons other than the one whose inter-
ests are invaded, or
e) to protect another interest than the one invaded, or
f) to protect against other harm than that which has resulted, or
g) to protect against any hazards than that from which the harm
has resulted.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1964).
32. See Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
COLum. L. REv. 21, 23 (1949) (arguing that violation of criminal statutes should
give rise to civil liability because citizens are on notice that such conduct is
proscribed and because legislatures thoroughly investigate the practicality of
compliance with criminal statutes); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the
Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 456, 456 (1948) (a criminal statute
enacted for the protection of a specified class creates a civil right in members
of the class, although the only express sanctions are criminal).
State courts vary in the effect given to violation of a criminal statute in
civil actions. A large majority hold that when the defendant's conduct in vio-
lation of a criminal statute causes harm to one for whose benefit the statute
was enacted, the defendant's conduct constitutes negligence per se. See, e g.,
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558 (Minn. 1977)
(defendant furnace installer's violation of heating installation ordinances was
negligence per se, and the trial court properly declared defendant negligent as
a matter of law). Other courts hold that violation of such a criminal statute
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence. See eg., Zeni v. Ander-
son, 397 Mich. 117, 130, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (1976) (plaintiff accident victim's
violation of sidewalk use statute was only prima facie evidence of contributory
negligence, so plaintiff had opportunity to rebut the presumption of negligence
by showing that it was impractical to use the sidewalk). A small minority rule
that the defendant's conduct is merely evidence of negligence, which the jury
may accept or reject. See eg., Cantwell v. Cremins, 347 Mo. 836, 842, 149
S.W.2d 343, 346 (1941) (violation of a driving law constituted merely evidence
of negligence and the issue remained with the jury).
33. 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959).
34. Although no specific criminal statute was at issue in Agnew, the court
referred to CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118 (perjury), 127 (subornation of perjury),
and 135 (concealing or withholding documentary evidence). Agnew, 172 Cal.
App. 2d at 765, 343 P.2d at 124.
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after winning her medical malpractice case, alleged that the lo-
cal medical association had prevented doctors from testifying
about her injuries at trial, thereby interfering with the orderly
prosecution of her civil action. The court held that no civil
right could be predicated upon a mere violation of a criminal
statute and rejected a tort action for damages arising from the
withholding or concealing of documentary evidence. 35
Notwithstanding the appellate court's holding in Agnew,
the California Supreme Court in Williams v. State 36 implicitly
recognized a tort action for negligent spoliation of evidence. In
Williams, an injured motorist alleged that a negligent investi-
gation by highway patrol officers virtually destroyed her oppor-
tunity to obtain compensation for her injuries.37 The court held
that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, but only be-
cause she failed to allege that the officers owed her a duty to
preserve the evidence. 38 Thus, the court implied that it would
have recognized negligent spoliation of evidence as a new, in-
dependent tort if plaintiff had alleged and could have estab-
lished that defendant had breached its duty by failing to
investigate the accident properly.
Rather than permitting recovery in tort for intentional spo-
liation of evidence, other courts have dealt with spoliation
within the underlying litigation. Some courts have punished
spoliators for failure to comply with an order compelling or
permitting discovery.39 Under this approach, the court may cite
the spoliator for contempt of court,40 order the payment of ex-
penses, including attorneys fees, 41 or enter a default judgment
35. Agnew, 172 Cal. App. 2d at 765, 343 P.2d at 124. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court also emphasized the policy of putting an end to litigation. Id.
36. 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983). The Supreme
Court in Williams made no attempt to distinguish the Agnew court's denial of
an independent intentional tort action for withholding evidence.
37. Id at 21-22, 664 P.2d at 138, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
38. Id at 27, 664 P.2d at 143, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 239. The court did, however,
grant plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to allege that the officers owed
her a duty to investigate and preserve the evidence. Id. at 28, 664 P.2d at 143,
192 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); see, e.g., Professional Seminar Consultants v.
Sino Am. Tech., 727 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1984) (Rule 37 sanctions imposed after
plaintiff asserted that documents produced by defendant pursuant to a discov-
ery order were falsified).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); see, e.g., Molina v. El Paso Ind. School
Dist., 583 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff organization charged with deposi-
tion costs for failure to comply with court's discovery orders).
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against the spoliator.4 Other courts have permitted litigants to
introduce evidence of their opponents' spoliation on the theory
that it implies an admission of liability,4 3 permitting the infer-
ence that the evidence was unfavorable to the possessor.44
Prior to Smith, however, no court had recognized a separate
civil cause of action for the intentional spoliation of evidence.
Following the traditional method of tort recognition, the
California Court of Appeals in Smith v. Superior Court found
that Smith's right to bring a personal injury lawsuit was a le-
gally protectable interest and that her interest was invaded by
Abbott Ford's intentional spoliation of the evidence.45 The
court acknowledged that it was recognizing a "new and name-
less tort,"46 but concluded that the intentional spoliation of evi-
dence met the criteria set out by Professor Prosser and the case
law for the recognition of new torts.47 Specifically, the court
held that the intentional spoliation of evidence caused an "un-
reasonable interference with the interests of others,"48 that is,
with Smith's interest in having an opportunity to win her
suit.49 Emphasizing the importance of "probable expectancies,"
the court concluded that Smith's prospective personal injury
suit was significant enough to warrant protection from interfer-
42. See FED. RL Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see, ag., Professional Seminar Consul-
tants v. Sino Am. Tech., 757 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1984) (default judgment en-
tered against defendant for producing falsified documents following an order
permitting discovery). The decision as to which sanction to apply is within the
discretion of the trial court. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481
F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
43. See, ag., State v. Turner, 633 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Mo. CL App. 1982) (spo-
liation of evidence evinces a consciousness of guilt and thus is admissible as
nonhearsay); State v. Quigley, 591 S.W. 2d 740, 742 (Mo. CL App. 1979) (same).
44. This approach is known as the doctrine of omnia praesumuntur contra
spoliatorem (all is presumed against the destroyer of evidence). See 2 J. wiG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 291 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979). See generally
Comment, Omnia Praesumuntur Contra Spoliatorem, 1 ADEL. L. REV. 344,
344 (1962) ("The general principle is that where a person intentionally puts it
out of his power to produce something which he could produce, the object or
article being of a nature relevant to the claim or defence, the principle ...
will cause an unfavourable inference to be drawn against that person."). For
cases applying this doctrine, see Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Sausage, Inc., 379
F. Supp. 744, 751 (N.D. Tex. 1974), affd, 568 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1978); A.C.
Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 199 F. Supp. 544, 553 (N.D. IML 1961), qffd, 314
F.2d 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 816 (1963).
45. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
46. Id. at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 1,
at 3).
47. Id at 496, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
48. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 1, at 6).
49. Id. at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
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ence. 50 Because Abbott Ford's actions wronged Smith, the
court, reciting the familiar maxim that "for every wrong, there
is a remedy,"5 1 allowed Smith to proceed with a tort action for
intentional spoliation of evidence.
After recognizing the new tort, the court examined the al-
legations of Smith's complaint and determined that although
the allegations did not meet the traditional levels of specificity,
they were sufficient to state a cause of action. With respect to
the intent element, Smith's complaint alleged that Abbott Ford
"willfully, wrongfully, and intentionally, and with conscious
disregard of the probable serious harm to Plaintiffs, and with
malice and reckless indifference for the injurious consequences
of their acts, conceded, lost, destroyed or otherwise disposed of
the physical evidence which they had promised to maintain for
Plaintiffs."5 Although the court did not specifically address
the intent element, Smith's allegations clearly satisfy the tradi-
tional definition of intentional conduct.53
Proof of causation in actions for intentional spoliation of
evidence would seem particularly difficult. The Smith court,
however, relaxed the traditional standard of certainty, requir-
ing only that Smith allege that a "reasonable probability" ex-
isted that she would have obtained compensatory damages "but
for" Abbott Ford's spoliation of the van parts.1 The court
noted that the "reasonable probability" standard had been used
in several other contexts in which the defendant's conduct
harmed the plaintiff's probable expectancies.55
The "most troubling aspect," the court found, in recogniz-
ing a new tort for intentional spoliation of evidence is the prob-
lem of proving the certainty of damages. 56 The court
concluded, however, that the interference with Smith's pro-
spective civil suit, or more specifically, the significant prejudice
of Smith's opportunity to obtain compensation for her injuries,
was a legally compensable harm.57 To deny relief simply be-
cause damages could not be proven with the traditional requi-
site degree of certainty, therefore, would be tantamount to
50. Id
51. Id. at 496, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (West
1970)).
52. Id. at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
53. See supra text accompanying note 20.
54. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
55. Id.; c.f. supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
57. Id. at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
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finding that the interest invaded was not deserving of legal pro-
tection.ss Thus, the court did not demand that Smith allege the
damage amount with certainty, but required only that Smith
produce enough evidence to show the extent of her damages
"as a matter of just and reasonable inference."59
The Smith court also determined that the existence of an
applicable criminal sanction did not bar the plaintiff's separate
tort action.60 The court identified several types of other con-
duct that give rise to both criminal and civil liability and noted
that the criminal law and the tort law serve different, although
occasionally overlapping, social purposes.61 The public interest
in the administration of justice invaded by intentional spolia-
tion, which is protected by the criminal statute, differed in sub-
stance from Smith's private interest in obtaining compensation
through a personal injury action. Recognition of a separate tort
action, therefore, was necessary to provide the plaintiff with a
complete remedy.62 The court also recognized that the imposi-
tion of civil liability promotes the public interest in the admin-
istration of justice by providing an additional deterrent to the
destruction of evidence.63
The recognition of a prospective personal injury action as a
legally protected "probable expectancy" is consistent with gen-
eral tort principles. As Professor Prosser noted, the law of
torts "is directed toward the compensation of individuals . . .
for the losses which they have suffered in respect of all their
legally recognized interests."' ' Smith sustained permanent
58. Although Smith did not allege the amount of her damages with cer-
tainty, the court reasoned that barring a cause of action for this reason alone
would be a perversion of justice. Id at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
59. Id at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Pater-
son Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
60. Id. at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The Smith court distinguished Agnew
v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959), discussed supra notes 33-35
and accompanying text, on the grounds that the obstruction of justice suit in-
volved in Agnew was brought after the underlying litigation had been decided,
so that a collateral estoppel issue existed in Agnew that did not exist in Smith.
Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 498, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
61. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 499, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
62. Id- at 499, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
63. The court noted that California's criminal obstruction of justice stat-
ute, see supra note 6, had a minimal deterrent effect because the destruction of
evidence was only a misdemeanor. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 499, 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 835. Moreover, the court noted that the statute had apparently not
been used to punish the spoliation of evidence relevant to a prospective civil
suit in its 312-year history. Id at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
64. W. PRossER, supra note 5, § 1, at 6.
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physical injuries as a result of the automobile accident.' 5 A
personal injury lawsuit was a legally recognized procedure by
which Smith might be compensated for those injuries. When
Abbott Ford destroyed the evidence Smith needed to pursue
this action, it significantly prejudiced her opportunity to obtain
compensation. Although Smith could have attempted to pursue
her personal injury suit without the evidence, her efforts un-
doubtedly would have been hampered by Abbott Ford's inter-
ference. A tort cause of action for intentional spoliation of
evidence thus provided the only reliable means of compensat-
ing her injury.66 Had the court failed to recognize Smith's pro-
spective lawsuit as a protected "probable expectancy," the
compensatory goal of tort law would have been frustrated.
The Smith court appropriately noted the value of "prob-
able expectancies." According to Prosser, "since a large part of
what is most valuable in modern life depends upon 'probable
expectancies' as social and industrial life becomes more com-
plex, the courts must do more to discover, define and protect
them from undue interference. '6 7 With the increasing use of
lawsuits to settle differences, a prospective civil action is a com-
mon "probable expectancy" deserving of legal protection.68
The benefits of recognizing a tort cause of action for the in-
tentional spoliation of evidence outweigh any burdens that may
result to potential defendants. The new tort promotes both
public interests, by enhancing the administration of justice and
deterring the destruction of evidence, and private interests, by
providing an injured plaintiff with a realistic opportunity to re-
65. See supra note 1.
66. Rule 37 sanctions would not have been available to compensate Smith
because Abbott Ford had not violated any discovery order. See FED. R. Civ. P.
37(a), (b); infra text accompanying notes 102-103.
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 130, at 951 (quoting Jersey City Printing
Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 765, 53 A. 230, 233 (1902)).
68. One commentator has even suggested that persons have a property
right in the pursuit of an expected performance that should be free from in-
terference by third parties. See Note, An Analysis of the Formation of Prop-
erty Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other
Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1116, 1118 (1983). Persons acquire a
property right by giving notice to other parties of an intent to exclude them
from reaping the advantages of the expected performance and by gaining some
degree of control over the pursuit. Id. at 1136. Accordingly, Smith could claim
a property right in the pursuit of her personal injury lawsuit because she noti-
fied Abbott Ford of her intent to pursue a civil suit. Moreover, Smith gained
control over the pursuit of compensation when Abbott Ford agreed to retain
evidence for Smith to use in the prospective civil action. Smith's interest in
the lawsuit therefore is akin to a property right that deserves protection from
interference.
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ceive compensation for injuries. 69 Any burden imposed on po-
tential defendants would be minimal and may be largely
avoided. If, for example, the duty to preserve evidence proves
excessively costly to the custodian, the court may order the evi-
dence transferred to the other party and charge that party with
the duty of keeping the evidence at its own cost. The obligation
imposed thus may be seen as merely a duty to not spoliate
rather than an affirmative duty to preserve evidence.70
Applying the traditional tort elements of intent, causation,
and damages to the new tort may create difficulties in defining
the requisite standards of proof. With respect to the element of
intent, if the plaintiff need prove only that the defendant inten-
tionally spoliated evidence,71 and not that the defendant inten-
tionally interfered with plaintiff's suit, then the defendant
could be held liable for the destruction of potentially relevant
evidence in the course of routine document destruction. In
Smith, because plaintiff specifically requested Abbott Ford to
preserve the evidence pending investigation, Abbott Ford's de-
struction of the van parts clearly evidenced its intent to inter-
fere with Smith's prospective suit. The court therefore was not
required to address the intent element further. In the absence
of such compelling circumstances, however, traditional tort
principles suggest that courts should require plaintiffs seeking
recovery for intentional spoliation of evidence to prove that the
defendant intended to produce the harm or knew with substan-
tial certainty that the harm, the interference with another's
prospective civil suit, would follow. 72 For example, had Smith
69. See supm notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
70. Following the Smith court's rationale, this analysis thus far has as-
sumed that the plaintiff in the underlying action would be the party injured by
the defendant's intentional spoliation of evidence. The policy of deterring
such conduct would be equally served by permitting the defendant to bring a
separate action for intentional spoilation of evidence against the plaintiff who
injures a defendant by interfering with its defense in the underlying suit. The
need to recognize a new tort for the benefit of defendants deprived of a full
defense by the plaintiff's tortious conduct is less compelling, however, since
the recognition of a separate tort action is not necessary to serve the objective
of fully compensating the injured party. Moreover, in such a case, courts may
be more willing to invoke Rule 37 sanctions against the plaintiff-spoliator than
they would be against the defendant-spoliator, since in the latter situation the
defendant might be deprived of an opportunity to defend the suit. See infra
notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
71. Because the new tort has been defined as the intentional spoliation of
evidence, and the Smith court did not define the intent element specifically,
see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text, it is conceivable that future liti-
gants and courts will approach the intent element in this way.
72. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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not specifically requested the defendant to preserve the evi-
dence, the court could have required the plaintiff to prove that
defendant actually intended to interfere with Smith's prospec-
tive civil action by spoliating the evidence, or that defendant ac-
ted with knowledge that its conduct would result in such an
interference.
As with all interference torts,7 3 courts must relax the stan-
dards of proof of causation in suits seeking recovery for inter-
ference with a prospective civil action. Under the traditional
causation standard, Smith would have been required to prove
that she would have obtained compensation for her injuries
"but for" Abbott Ford's interference. 74 This standard would
have been difficult to satisfy because conceivably any number
of variables could have occurred during the litigation to impede
Smith's chances of securing compensation.7 5 Because Abbott
Ford possessed the van parts, it had special knowledge concern-
ing the cause of the accident, without which Smith would have
been hard pressed to prove that she would have recovered had
the parts not been spoliated.7 6 Therefore, the Smith court held
that the plaintiff was required to prove only that a "reasonable
probability" existed that she would have obtained compensation
"but for" Abbott Ford's conduct.77 This relaxed standard prop-
erly reflects the realization that because the future benefit is
only a "probable expectancy," the plaintiff need only prove the
"probability" of receiving the benefit.
The Smith causation standard, although relaxed, nonethe-
73. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
75. For example, Smith's attempt to obtain compensation could have been
hindered by the death of witnesses, a change in law, or the inadequate per-
formance of her attorneys.
76. See supra note 4.
77. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. Obtaining com-
pensation includes not only recovering damages by a jury verdict or court or-
der in a successful civil suit, but also receiving compensation through
settlement. Thus, plaintiffs should not be required to prove that they would
have won their underlying lawsuits in order to establish a causative link be-
tween the spoliation and the injury; interference with the plaintiff's ability to
settle the case also may cause injury. This relaxed causation standard has
been applied frequently in cases alleging interference with a prospective ad-
vantage. In Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 37 A.2d 355 (1944), for exam-
ple, a real estate broker alleged that his client, a purchaser of property, lied to
the vendor concerning the identity of the broker, thus precluding the plaintiff
broker from receiving his commission. The court held that the plaintiff was
required to demonstrate that but for the tortious interference of the purchaser
there was a "reasonable probability" that the broker would have entered into
a contract or made a profit. Id. at 675, 37 A.2d at 356.
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less requires a plaintiff essentially to prove the merits of the
underlying claim. Such a standard is not without precedence in
tort law; it is also used, for example, in legal malpractice ac-
tions.78 In fact, the causation standard in legal malpractice
cases is often more stringent: the plaintiff must prove that "but
for" the attorney's negligence, plaintiff would have been suc-
cessful in the case.79 Despite the difficulty in proving causation,
legal malpractice claims are being brought, and won, with in-
creasing frequency.8 0
Recognizing a tort action for interference with a prospec-
tive civil suit also requires relaxing the damages standard.
Under the traditional damages standard, a plaintiff must prove
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.8 ' This stan-
dard presents a problem for a plaintiff alleging intentional in-
terference with a prospective civil action because such a
standard would require that the plaintiff attempt to quantify
exactly the value of the case had the evidence not been de-
stroyed.8 2 A plaintiff could, for example, use expert testimony
to show the settlement value of the lawsuit or the amount of
damages recoverable on the underlying claim, but such testi-
mony of course would be a mere estimate. The Smith court
thus appropriately lessened the plaintiff's burden by requiring
only that she prove the extent of her damages as a matter of
78. See, eg., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(causation standard in legal malpractice actions "requires in effect that a plain-
tiff prove the merits of the underlying case").
79. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 1980), cerL denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980); see also Parker v. Daelen Corp., 59 A.D.2d 375, 377, 399
N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (1977) (plaintiff must prove that "but for" the negligence of
the attorney, plaintiff's claim would or could have been collected). For a slight
relaxation of the "but for" causation standard in legal malpractice actions, see
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 20 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (breach of attor-
ney's duty need only be "a" substantial factor in plaintiff's failure to recover,
not necessarily "the" substantial factor); Murphy v. Edwards & Warren, P-A.,
36 N.C. App. 653, 658, 245 S.E.2d 212, 217, cert. denied, 248 S.E.2d 728 (N.C.
1978) (conduct of the attorney need not be the sole cause of the client's loss).
80. See generally Carroll, Legal Malpractice, 15 ARK. LAW. 46, 47 (1981)
(reporting that legal malpractice claims were filed against an estimated 10% of
all practicing attorneys in 1979 and that the average amount of claims paid had
more than doubled from 1971 to 1975).
81. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 30, at 143-44.
82. Raoul D. Kennedy of the Oakland law firm of Crosby, Heafey, Roach
& May characterizes Smith v. Superior Court as "the ultimate in speculation."
Goodrich, supra note 4, at 15. The most problematic aspect of the case, accord-
ing to Kennedy, is the question of damages: "Does the plaintiff ask himself,
"What would the case be worth if I did have this evidence?' You could be ask-
ing the jury to quantify the unquantifiable." Id. at 15.
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"just and reasonable inference. 83 In doing so, the Smith court
adopted the rationale commonly advanced in legal malpractice
actions, which requires that damages be measured by the
amount that could have been recovered in the underlying ac-
tion.84 Because the underlying claim in both malpractice and
spoliation of evidence actions has not been resolved at trial, the
exact amount of damages cannot be proved conclusively. It
would be unjust to deny recovery to a plaintiff for failing to
prove an exact assessment of the damages when the very rea-
son the plaintiff cannot make such an assessment is the basis
for the cause of action.85 To do so would allow the spoliator to
profit from wrongdoing.
A relaxed damages standard has been employed in a
number of situations in which the amount of damages cannot
be proved with a high degree of certainty. In antitrust cases,
for example, the exact amount of damages suffered by a new
business as a result of an antitrust violation is often incapable
of precise proof because of the unavailability of an economic
history. Courts have reduced the standard of certainty in such
cases to allow recovery for damages such as lost profits or in-
jury to the plaintiff's business that were once considered too
speculative.86 Similarly, in wrongful death and personal injury
cases, compensation for lost future earnings, although specula-
tive and inherently difficult to prove, is regularly awarded.87 In
such cases, courts instruct the jury to calculate net earnings
83. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
84. See Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Christy
v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 294 (1970).
85. See, e.g., Frito Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 427 F. Supp. 677,
678 (D. Mo. 1977) (defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult
the ascertainment of precise damages suffered by plaintiff is "not entitled to
complain that they cannot be measured with the same exactness and precision
as would otherwise be possible"); see also supra note 58.
86. See Rulon, Proof of Damages for Terminated or Precluded Plaintiffs,
49 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 154 (1981) (explaining that antitrust plaintiffs may
prove damages by expert testimony of the going concern value of the business
or by lost profits, even though such items of damage may be speculative).
87. See Note, Tort Damages: The Adjustment of Awards for Lost Future
Earning Capacity to Compensate for Inflation and Increased Productivity:
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980), 7 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 139, 144 (1981) (reporting Pennsylvania decision allowing testimony
showing the impact of inflation and increased productivity on decedent's fu-
ture earning power in order to more accurately estimate damages); see also
Johnson & Flanigan, Economic Valuation for Wrongful Death, 6 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 47, 49 (1984) (examining North Carolina's wrongful death statute per-
mitting a broad range of evidence, including expert testimony by economists,
on the issue of damages in order to combat the difficulty of proof inherent in
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over the plaintiffs life expectancy by estimating lost gross
earnings and deducting from the figure the plaintiffs estimated
personal maintenance costs.8s Such formulas may occasionally
produce inaccurate results, but the importance of granting the
plaintiff some recovery overrides this concern.8 9 The Smith
court acknowledged this fact for plaintiffs seeking recovery for
intentional spoliation of evidence when it allowed Smith to
prove the extent of her damages as a matter of just and reason-
able inference.
The Smith court properly rejected Abbott Ford's argument
that California's criminal statute prohibiting the spoliation of
evidence precluded a civil action.90 Tortfeasors should not es-
cape civil liability merely because their tortious acts violate a
criminal statute.9 1 Not only is the possibility of prosecution un-
likely,9 2 but sole reliance on criminal sanctions to deal with the
defendant's illegal conduct would fail to compensate the in-
jured plaintiff. Intentional destruction of evidence invades both
public and private interests, 93 both of which are deserving of ju-
dicial protection. A criminal statute does protect the public in-
measuring such recoverable intangibles as expected net income, companion-
ship, guidance, and advice of the decedent).
88. See Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 564, 421 A.2d 1027, 1028-29
(1980).
89. See, eg., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
124 (1969) (courts apply lenient damages standards because failure to do so
would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so effective and complete as to
render measure of damages uncertain and preclude any recovery). See gener-
ally DOBBS, REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQuITY-RESTITUTION § 3.1, at 135 (1973)
(plaintiffs are expected to prove damages with accuracy but "precision not at-
tainable in the nature of the claim and circumstances is not ordinarily re-
quired"). Such a policy justification also supports the awarding of damages in
other actions such as those for trademark infringement, libel, slander, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all of which require
inherently difficult damage calculations.
90. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The Smith
court's treatment of Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959),
see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text, overlooked an important consid-
eration. A civil action against witnesses for perjury, at issue in Agnew, is prob-
lematic not only because the new cause of action would have involved
essentially a relitigation of matters already adjudicated, but also because wit-
nesses are immune from civil action. See Note, supra note 24, at 35. This con-
cern is not present in a civil action against a party for intentional spoliation of
evidence, however, because the parties to the action do not have immunity
from civil liability.
9L See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
92. California's criminal obstruction of justice statute, for example, has
not been used to punish the destruction of evidence to be used in a civil suit in
its 112-year history. See supra notes 6 & 63.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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terest in avoiding obstruction of justice. Intentional spoliation
of evidence, however, also significantly prejudices a plaintiff's
opportunity to obtain compensation to which he or she may be
legally entitled. Convincing a judge or jury of the defendant's
liability may be extremely difficult for the plaintiff without the
aid of the spoliated evidence. Plaintiff's ability to settle the
case would also be impaired because without the wrongfully de-
stroyed evidence, the plaintiff has little leverage to induce a
settlement. Thus, because the criminal statute redresses only
the public injury of obstruction of justice, the fundamental
compensatory objectives of tort law demand that the injured
party be permitted a cause of action in tort against the
spoliator.
Although the Smith court properly concluded that a crimi-
nal statute for spoliation of evidence did not preclude Smith's
separate tort action, it neglected to adequately employ the
criminal statute in defining the new tort.94 Obstruction of jus-
tice statutes generally impose a duty to not conceal, destroy, or
otherwise dispose of evidence on one who knows or has reason
to know that the evidence may -be needed for an investigation
or for contemplated or pending litigation.95 These statutes thus
may form the basis for the new tort by defining the duty of
care owed by the spoliator. The duty, owing to any reasonably
foreseeable plaintiff, arises when a reasonable person in the cir-
cumstances of the actor would know that the evidence is or will
be sought in the investigation or litigation.96 In Smith, because
Abbott Ford expressly promised Smith that it would preserve
the evidence, the court relied exclusively on the defendant's
promise in finding that plaintiff stated a cause of action in
tort.97 In cases in which the defendant's duty cannot be pre-
mised on an express promise to preserve evidence, the court
should define the alleged spoliator's duty by applying the stan-
94. A criminal statute often is used to define the duty of care owed by the
actor in tort actions founded in negligence. See supra notes 31-32 and accom-
panying text. Violation of a criminal statute also provides the basis for inten-
tional tort actions. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 6 & 23.
96. Although the various criminal statutes prohibiting the destruction of
evidence do not adopt the standard of care of a reasonable person, such a stan-
dard is commonly used in tort law. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 1, at 6.
97. An unduly narrow reading of the Smith holding would severely limit
the use of the new tort. See Goodrich, supra note 4, at 15 ("If Smith is read
narrowly, a plaintiff would have to show he had an agreement with the de-
fendant or third party to preserve the evidence.").
[Vol. 69:961
TORT LAW
dard of care set out in the state's criminal statute. If such a
duty is recognized, an intentional or negligent 98 breach of that
duty would give rise to tort liability.
The Smith court did not discuss alternative, noncriminal
means of dealing with the spoliation problem within the under-
lying litigation itself.99 If other sanctions could effectively de-
ter spoliation and adequately compensate the plaintiff,
recognition of a separate tort action for spoliation of evidence
perhaps would be unnecessary. None of the sanctions devel-
oped so far, however, adequately protect both the public inter-
est in deterrence and the private interest in compensation.
Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for ex-
ample, a court may impose sanctions for failure to comply with
discovery requests. Thus, a defendant may be held in contempt
and fined for spoliation of requested information or evidence.1 GO
As in the case of criminal statutes, however, contempt citations
fail to compensate the injured plaintiff. Rule 37 also permits
the imposition of a default judgment on a defendant who
spoliates evidence.' 0 ' Although this measure does compensate
the plaintiff, because the plaintiff actually wins the underlying
suit, the sanction can be imposed only after the defendant fails
to properly respond to both a discovery request and a court or-
der compelling discovery. 0 2 A defendant who destroys evi-
dence prior to a discovery request is unable to comply with any
subsequent request and therefore could not be punished for
failing to comply.'0 3 In Smith, for example, Abbott Ford de-
stroyed the van parts before the plaintiff had requested them in
98. This Comment does not attempt to further analyze the appropriate-
ness of recognizing a tort action for interference with a prospective civil suit
by negligent spoliation of evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
Negligence actions for other interference torts typically are not allowed unless
the interfering act is itself a tort. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 130; supra
note 14. Because the destruction of evidence is not a separate tort, unless of
course the evidence is the property of another person, recognition of a tort ac-
tion for negligent spoliation of evidence may be problematic.
99. For a discussion of available noncriminal means of dealing with spolia-
tion of evidence, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
101. See FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also supra note 42.
102. See Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1135 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rule 37 sanc-
tions ordinarily are imposed only after violation of a court order, the only ex-
ceptions are sanctions for failure to admit, to attend the party's own
deposition, to serve answers to interrogatories, or to respond to a request for
inspection).
103. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (inability
to comply is an absolute defense to Rule 37 sanctions).
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the formal discovery process. Because Abbott Ford had not vio-
lated a discovery rule, this sanction could not be invoked. Fur-
thermore, even when a party does violate a discovery rule, the
decision whether to impose a sanction lies in the discretion of
the trial judge.10 4 The trial judge's discretion to enter a default
judgment against the defendant, the only Rule 37 sanction that
compensates the plaintiff, is much narrower than is the court's
discretion in imposing other sanctions.10 5 Consequently, even
when Rule 37 sanctions are available, the court may be reluc-
tant to impose this most severe penalty, even though it is the
only sanction that would adequately protect both the public and
private interests invaded by the spoliation of evidence.'00
Another noncriminal means of dealing with spoliation
within the underlying litigation itself is to permit counsel to in-
troduce evidence to the jury concerning the spoliation and to
allow the jury to infer from that evidence an admission of the
defendant's liability. This method, however, does not effec-
tively deter spoliation. The fact finder is not required to infer
the spoliator's liability; rather, the judge or jury merely is per-
mitted to do so.' 0 7 Consequently, a defendant faced with the
possibility of potentially large liability in the underlying action
may choose to spoliate the damaging evidence and risk explain-
ing its conduct to the court or jury. A court that chooses to em-
ploy this means of addressing the spoliation problem should
require at least that the spoliation be given the effect of a legal
presumption of liability.'0 8 Such a presumption is justified
in this situation because the defendant has special knowledge
concerning both the evidence and the destruction of the evi-
dence, and the plaintiff is left with no means of obtaining this
information. Furthermore, the use of a legal presumption of
104. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
105. See, e.g., Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 518 (1977)
(trial court's entry of default judgment against defendant auto manufacturer
for failure to produce evidence of safety tests in products liability action was
clearly erroneous).
106. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183, 278 (1971) (noting the reluctance of courts to deny defendants the
right to litigate by imposing default judgment under Rule 37).
107. See supra note 44.
108. A presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence and often op-
erates to shift the burden of persuasion as well. See C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 345 (2nd ed. 1977). Reasons for creating
presumptions include a judicial estimate of the probability of the thing pre-
sumed, fairness in light of defendant's superior access to the evidence, diffi-
culty in proving the matter in any other way, and social policy. Id. § 343.
[Vol. 69:961
TORT LAW
liability would have a stronger deterrent effect on potential
spoliators than would merely allowing the jury to infer
liability.
Recognizing a separate tort action for spoliation of evi-
dence, however, would have an even stronger deterrent effect
on potential spoliators. The Smith case is illustrative. Abbott
Ford, when confronted with a tort action for the intentional de-
struction of evidence, produced the allegedly destroyed, lost, or
transferred evidence and soon settled the case.' 0 9 Although the
sudden reappearance of the evidence may have been coinciden-
tal, it is not unreasonable to postulate that Abbott Ford would
not have "destroyed, lost, or transferred" the evidence in the
first place had its liability in tort for nonproduction of the evi-
dence been clear from the outset. Thus, as a means of deter-
ring spoliation and compensating the injured party, allowing a
separate tort action for intentional spoliation of evidence is
preferrable to either imposing Rule 37 sanctions or introducing
evidence of spoliation to the fact finder.
Because litigants often suspect their opponents of attempt-
ing to hide their liability by destroying, or at least withholding,
relevant evidence, °0 recognition of the tort of intentional spoli-
ation of evidence may increase litigation. A problem of limita-
tion arises because a plaintiff could sue for the spoliation of any
type of evidence, including documents."- Regardless of the
type of evidence involved, the new tort should be used only
when spoliation significantly prejudices the plaintiff's opportu-
nity to obtain compensation. Although a precise test is difficult
to formulate, the new cause of action should be permitted only
in those cases in which the property destroyed constitutes po-
109. See supra note 4.
110. This suspicion may not be unfounded. United States District Court
Judge Miles Lord recently commented during a speech to members of the
Hennepin County Bar Association in Minneapolis, Minnesota: "I believe that
many companies do not turn over documents as they are required to do in law-
suits.... I have handled only two cases in 20 years on the federal bench in
which I believe the bulk of papers were properly produced." Many Firms Fail
to Turn Over Data, Lord Says, Mpls. Star & Trib., Nov. 20, 1984, at 14B, col. 2.
1-U. The Smith decision may be relevant in situations like the Dalkon
Shield products liability cases currently being litigated across the nation. The
manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, A.H. Robbins Co., and its attorneys, have
been accused of destroying documents evidencing their early knowledge of the
product's defects, thus interfering with the civil suits of injured users of the
device. See A.H. Robbins is Due in Court to Explain How Dalkon Shield Pa-
pers Disappeared, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1984, at 8, col. 1. If such documents
were destroyed after they were requested, however, Rule 37 sanctions would
be applicable, and a separate tort action may be unnecessary.
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tential evidence without which proof of an essential tort ele-
ment is rendered unreasonably difficult. Such unreasonable
difficulty may arise when there is no secondary evidence that
can be used to prove a particular element of the underlying
cause of action. In a products liability case, for example, de-
struction of the defective product leaves the injured plaintiff
with no direct evidence to prove the product's defectiveness.
Although the plaintiff may resort to the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur,112 plaintiff would be left with only circumstantial evi-
dence of the defendant's liability. Unreasonable difficulty of
proof is also present when the secondary evidence on which the
plaintiff must rely is of such dubious value, as determined by
the trial judge, that the plaintiff has no realistic possibility of
proving a particular element of the underlying action. The trial
court should assess the effect of the spoliation on the basis of
"the ability of the injured party to establish [his or her]
case," 113 the same standard used in imposing a default judg-
ment for failure to comply with discovery.114 If a plaintiff
could prove the case even without the evidence, plaintiff cannot
allege a legally cognizable harm, and the court should order the
plaintiff to pursue the underlying litigation without the
spoliated evidence.115
Even with this suggested limitation, however, the new tort
of interference with a prospective civil suit by intentional spoli-
ation of evidence will provide an effective means of compensat-
ing persons who are significantly prejudiced by the spoliator's
112. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits a plaintiff to satisfy the bur-
den of producing evidence of defendant's negligence by proving that the plain-
tiff has been injured by a casualty of a sort that normally would not have
occurred in the absence of the defendant's negligence. See C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 108, § 342, at 804. Most courts agree that res ipsa loquitur permits
merely an inference of negligence. See, e.g., Gardner v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 55 (1964) (res ipsa does not place the burden of
persuasion on defendant; it warrants, but does not compel, an inference); see
also W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 40, at 231 (res ipsa is a "simple matter of cir-
cumstantial evidence").
113. Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 505 (1977) (explaining
trial court's discretion to impose default judgment upon failure to comply with
discovery).
114. Id.
115. The plaintiff may still seek redress while pursuing the underlying liti-
gation. For example, plaintiff may be permitted to introduce into evidence the
fact that defendant spoliated the evidence, in which case the jury may Infer
that its contents were unfavorable to the defendant. See supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text. If plaintiff had served a formal discovery request prior to
the spoliation, the plaintiff may also move for sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P.
37 or the state's equivalent. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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interference and will warn would-be spoliators that such con-
duct will no longer be tolerated. By recognizing the new tort,
courts will signal that society will not allow litigants to shield
themselves from liability by spoliating relevant evidence, safe
in the knowledge that recrimination is limited to the remote
chance of a misdemeanor prosecution" 6 or a slightly tougher
battle in court should their opponent attempt to prove spolia-
tion while pursuing the underlying litigation." 7 Plaintiffs who
experience such impermissible interference with their prospec-
tive civil suits need and deserve this new tort action.
Pati Jo Pofahl
116. See supra note 63.
117. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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